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THE CYAN DECISION AND ITS IMPACT ON
STATE-LEVEL SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS
B. John Torabi*
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s decision in Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County
Employees Retirement Fund† preserved the Securities Act of 1933’s
bar on removing securities class actions brought in state court to
federal court. The unanimous ruling cut against a nearly quartercentury long trend of pushing securities class action litigation to the
federal courts. Cyan was resolved purely through statutory
interpretation, leaving many of the underlying policy questions to be
resolved by state courts and in future rulings.
This Note examines the intention of the drafters of the Securities Act
of 1933 in designing a disclosure-focused regulatory scheme with a
private right of action to protect the integrity of the financial
markets. As such private litigation grew in quantity and dollar
amount through the class action mechanism, Congress attempted to
limit such actions by raising various procedural and substantive
requirements in federal courts in successive reform legislation.
These reforms made state courts a more attractive venue for
securities class actions, raising concerns about forum shopping,
conflicting rulings, and possible chilling effects on future Initial
Public Offerings of securities due to this uncertainty.
With the Cyan ruling, investors and their advocates have retained the
ability to litigate claims brought solely under the Securities Act of
1933 in state courts. The significance of this relatively narrow class
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of securities lawsuits, primarily affecting IPO-related litigation,
remains to be seen.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 254
I. ORIGINS ........................................................................................ 256
A. The Federal Securities Laws .................................................. 256
B. The Securities Class Action Reform Era ............................... 260
1. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) . 261
2. The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
1998 (SLUSA) ................................................................. 264
3. Continued Federalization of Class Actions under the
Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) ................................. 265
C. The Federal Courts ................................................................. 266
II. CYAN AND AFTERMATH ................................................................ 268
A. The Cyan Decision ................................................................. 269
B. Filing and Success Rates for State Securities Class Actions
Before and After Cyan ........................................................... 272
C. Further Development of Section 11 Suits .............................. 274
III. ANALYSIS ....................................................................................... 275

INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County
Employees Retirement Fund1 was remarkable in several aspects. First, it
preserved the bar on removing claims brought in state court set forth in
the Securities Act of 1933, marking a rare freeze in a nearly quartercentury general trend of pushing securities class action litigation to the
federal courts.2 Second, it was a unanimous ruling in the highly
politicized area of securities litigation during the polarized 2017
Supreme Court term, during which the Court issued a record percentage
of 5–4 decisions with a conservative majority.3 Key to the Cyan result
1.
2.

138 S. Ct. 1061 (2018).
See infra Sections I.B.–I.D.; see also Marc I. Steinberg & Brent A. Kirby, The
Assault on Section 11 of the Securities Act: A Study in Judicial Activism, 63 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2010).
3. See Adam Feldman, Final Stat Pack for October Term 2018, SCOTUSBLOG,
(June 28, 2019, 5:59 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/final-stat-pack-foroctober-term-2018 [https://perma.cc/HTY2-6QKT]. During the 2017 term, 74% of the
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was that the dispute was resolved solely as a question of statutory
interpretation with respect to applying the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA) amendments to the original 1933 Act,4
leaving lower courts to reconcile the policy implications in subsequent
decisions.5
The two primary regulatory mechanisms for the large U.S.
corporation are the federal securities laws and state corporate law,
primarily that of Delaware.6 The securities laws, particularly the 1934
Act, operate principally as disclosure and trading rules, while state
corporate law regulates shareholder voting and the internal affairs of the
corporation.7 However, there is substantial overlapping authority and
complex interaction between these bodies of law.8 Especially where the
safeguards of state corporate law and internal accounting controls fail,
as in the Enron,9 WorldCom,10 Vivendi,11 and Halliburton12 scandals,
investors turn to federal authorities and securities law for relief, not to
state corporate law.13 Accordingly, when statutory conflict arises, it is
usually left to the federal courts to untangle these interactions. 14
This note seeks to place the Cyan decision in a broader policy
context by: (1) relating the history and intent of the federal securities
5–4 decisions were decided by a conservative majority, a record amount for the Roberts
Court. Id.; see also DONNA M. NAGY, RICHARD W. PAINTER & MARGARET V. SACHS,
SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 16 (4th ed. 2017).
4. See Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1066.
5. See infra Sections II.A, II.C; see, e.g., In re Everquote, Inc. Sec. Litig., 106
N.Y.S.3d 828, 837 (Sup. Ct. 2019); Coffey v. Ripple Labs, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 3d 952,
958–59 (N.D. Cal. 2018); Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102, 132–37 (Del. 2020).
6. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 610 (2003).
7. See id. at 615–16.
8. See, e.g., id. at 611-16.
9. See id. at 591.
10. See id.
11. See Jennifer Bayot, Vivendi Pays $50 Million In Settlement With S.E.C., N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 24, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/24/business/vivendi-pays50-million-in-settlement-with-sec.html [https://perma.cc/2NX7-YVGW].
12. See Press Release, SEC, Halliburton Paying $29.2 Million to Settle FCPA
Violations (Jul. 27, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-133
[https://perma.cc/R2KF-QNLM] (announcing the settlement agreement related to
Halliburton’s violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) while competing
for oil field contracts in Angola).
13. See, e.g., id.; Roe, supra note 6, at 591; Bayot, supra note 11.
14. On the occasions that the federal security laws intersect with state corporate
law, the state courts may have their say. See, e.g., Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d
102, 109 (Del. 2020).
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laws and class action reform; (2) discussing how the conflict at the
center of the dispute arose through repeated Congressional amendments
to the federal securities laws; (3) observing the questions left
unanswered by the ruling; and (4) analyzing the development of
subsequent case law. Part I outlines the development of the federal
securities laws from the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 through the class action reform era, during which Congress
and the federal courts progressively raised the threshold requirements to
maintaining such suits. Part II discusses Cyan and its immediate
progeny, analyzing its effect on state court class action filings by
comparing pre- and post-Cyan empirical studies. Part III suggests that
while a reversal in the trend of federalizing securities class actions is
unlikely, the Cyan decision’s preservation of the narrow class of pure
1933 Act state court class actions is nonetheless a victory for investors
and their advocates; it faithfully maintains the original intent of the 1933
Act, which is to provide defrauded investors with a forum of their
choosing.
I. ORIGINS
First enacted nearly ninety years ago, the federal securities laws
have evolved through further legislation and numerous court decisions.15
However, the fundamental disclosure-focused regulatory scheme
envisioned by the drafters remains intact.
A. THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
The Securities Act of 1933 (the “1933 Act”) and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”) are the principal federal
securities statutes.16 These laws were enacted in the aftermath of the
1929 stock market crash, when the inadequacy of state blue sky laws to
adequately protect investors from security fraud became apparent.17 The
political environment was charged, with the public perception of the

15.
16.
17.

See Steinberg & Kirby, supra note 2, at 4–8.
See NAGY ET AL., supra note 3, at 2.
James Landis, a drafter of the 1933 Act, described the original “Thompson bill”
which he was tasked with re-writing as “based . . . in large measure on the blue sky
legislation of the states.” James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act
of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 31 (1959).
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investment banking industry at an all-time low and a newly elected
president, who had campaigned on a promise to reduce the power and
influence of Wall Street, pushing for reform.18 Remarkably, the goal of
heightened regulation of securities markets coincided with specific
interests of the securities industry: Namely, restoring the confidence of
the investing public and implementing rules that restricted dealing in
fraudulent or high-risk securities, without excessively restricting the
ability of the large investment banks to perform their underwriting
function.19 Thus, there was broad support for a federal anti-fraud-on-themarket law not only among the general public, but also from the leading
underwriters of the day, who ultimately faced reduced competition as a
result of the restrictions introduced by the 1933 Act.20
The 1933 Act imposed liability on issuers and underwriters for
material misstatements, omissions, and fraudulent conduct in connection
with public offerings of securities.21 Companies offering securities to the
public were required to make “full and fair disclosure” of relevant
information, and the 1933 Act contained express private rights of action
to supplement federal enforcement of those obligations.22 Section 11 of
the 1933 Act imposes strict civil liability for untrue or misleading
statements or omissions in registration statements filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), with the purpose of
ensuring full and accurate disclosure by issuers.23 Section 12(a)(2) gives
purchasers an express right of rescission against sellers who make
material misstatements or omissions by means of a prospectus or certain

18. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Political Economy of the Securities Act of 1933, 30
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2001).
19. See Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77, 92 nn.77–79 (2003).
Mahoney finds that in the wake of the Securities Act, market share and profits for the
“traditionally dominant wholesale underwriters” increased at the expense of integrated
investment banks with their own retail outlets, who had emerged as serious competitors
in the underwriting business in the years preceding the 1929 crash. See Mahoney, supra
note 18, at 19–20, 27–28.
20. See Mahoney, supra note 18, at 30–31. Certain provisions of the 1933 Act went
beyond what was necessary for full disclosure, instead serving to protect the leading
underwriters of the time from competition by prohibiting public disclosures related to
an offering prior to filing a registration statement with the SEC. Id. at 3 n.7. This
requirement was later relaxed, but initially made it difficult for upstart underwriters to
market their offerings. Id. at 31.
21. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77(k).
22. Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cnty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1066 (2018).
23. Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 272 (2d Cir. 1967).
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oral communications.24 Some overlap exists between the two sections,
with both covering misleading statements made in connection with
registered securities offerings, but while Section 11 covers the entire
registration statement, Section 12(a)(2) covers only the prospectus and
certain oral statements.25 Neither section requires a showing of scienter
or causation, a deliberate watering down of the traditional common law
fraud elements meant to encourage compliance and enforcement of the
law.26
Section 22(a) also includes a general bar on removal for cases
brought under Section 11, stating that “no case . . . brought in any State
court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the
United States.”27 This idiosyncratic provision of the 1933 Act, destined
to become the central issue of Cyan, not only granted concurrent
jurisdiction over private securities actions alleging 1933 Act claims to
both federal and state courts, but took the unusual step of expressly
barring removal from state to federal courts for such claims.28
As noted by James M. Landis, one of the drafters of the revised
Securities Act, the documented legislative history of the 1933 Act is
“scanty,”29 but his recollections provide a basic outline of some of the
considerations behind the 1933 Act’s unique features. Requiring
registration of certain offerings of securities, rather than registration of
the securities themselves, was the major innovation of the 1933 Act over

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 564 (1995).
See NAGY ET AL., supra note 3, at 299.
See id. at 260, 299.
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §77(v).
See Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cnty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1069 (2018);
see also 15 U.S.C. §77(v).
29. Landis, supra note 17, at 29 & n.1. In Landis’s telling, the 1933 Act was
drafted by himself, Benjamin V. Cohen, Thomas G. Corcoran (the latter two both
members of President Roosevelt’s “Brain Trust”), and House Legislative Counsel
Middleton G. Beaman, working under the direction of then-Professor Felix Frankfurter.
See id. at 33, 36. Their proposed legislation replaced the earlier version of the bill
known as the “Thompson bill,” based largely on the existing state blue sky laws and
containing many deficiencies which the new drafters sought to rectify. Id. at 31. The
bill was drafted in great secrecy, particularly from the scrutiny of Wall Street and
underwriters. Id. at 38–39. However, at the insistence of Rep. Sam Rayburn, a “select
group” of New York securities lawyers were allowed to see the draft bill and offer
criticism before it went to the full House Committee, though no significant changes
resulted from their input. Id. at 40. Landis freely admitted that his recollections, more
than a quarter century old at the time of his writing, warranted some scrutiny. Id. at 29.
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the blue sky laws that preceded it.30 This disclosure-focused theory was
inspired by the contemporaneous English Companies Act of 1929,
which similarly emphasized public availability of accurate corporate
information.31 The original draft of the 1933 Act had copied the
registration scheme used by the blue sky laws, but the final bill
produced by Landis and others (working under future Supreme Court
Justice Felix Frankfurter) focused on the initial sale and offering to the
public rather than the security itself.32 None of the preceding state blue
sky laws had recognized such a distinction,33 and it remains a defining
feature of the 1933 Act.34 The revised draft adopted this focus on the
issuance of securities, rather than the underlying security itself, so as not
to freeze dealing in outstanding securities.35
The fundamentally disclosure-oriented regulatory scheme of the
1933 Act had the additional advantage of limiting its requirements to
full and fair disclosure of material facts relating to the offered security,
without imposing judgment on the security’s investment quality.36 In
conjunction with the mandatory waiting period before registration
statements became effective, this structure permitted the SEC to suspend
public offerings if disclosure obligations were not met or facts within
the registration filings were misrepresented.37 In the meantime, investors
could scrutinize the filings, dealers could reach an estimate of the
offered security’s quality, and underwriters could have a degree of
assurance that the SEC would not halt trading in the midst of an
offering, leaving them holding a stack of unsaleable securities.38
Civil liability for corporate directors and officers was subject to the
“bitterest struggle” between the House and Senate bills in the

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See id. at 32.
See id. at 34 & n.9.
See id. at 32.
See id. at 31.
Like the blue sky laws, the 1934 Act also requires maintaining registration of
securities in order to be eligible to trade on the stock exchanges. See id. at 32 n.8.
35. See id. at 31 (“[The original draft] did not exempt sales of outstanding
securities . . . a factor that would have frozen dealing in securities inasmuch as
registration was required regardless of whether [a non-public] offering of these
securities was being made . . . .”).
36. See id. at 34. This impetus is further evidenced by the 1933 Act’s other name,
the “truth in securities” law. See The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/answers/about-lawsshtml.html [https://perma.cc/KDV9-5ZVY].
37. See Landis, supra note 17, at 34.
38. See id. at 35.
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Conference Committee.39 The House bill’s interpretation, which held
such fiduciary actors to a standard of due diligence, ultimately prevailed
over the Senate’s more extreme “insurer’s liability” which would have
imposed “an unjust and insurmountable burden on those who have the
responsibility for the conduct of corporate enterprise.”40 Less
controversial was the exemption for private offerings of securities,
which recognized that sophisticated private investors and banks “who
are shown to be able to fend for themselves” fell outside the 1933 Act’s
purposive scope of protecting the investing public.41 The 1933 Act’s
disclosure scheme was aimed at such investors, not sophisticated private
parties.
B. THE SECURITIES CLASS ACTION REFORM ERA
In the decades following the passage of the 1933 and 1934 Acts,
securities litigation doctrine developed primarily in the federal courts
through an era of judicial activism.42 The intertwined nature of the 1933
and 1934 Acts became clear, with courts applying and interpreting these
laws as “interrelated components of the federal regulatory scheme
governing transactions in securities.”43 Most significantly, the courts
recognized and upheld implied private rights of action under Rule 10b5, mirroring the express private right of action under Section 11 of the
1933 Act.44 Once the Supreme Court adopted the presumption of
reliance for class actions brought under Rule 10b-5 through the “fraudon-the-market” theory,45 a significant hurdle to class certification was
removed, making it significantly easier to bring securities class action

39.
40.

Id. at 48.
Id. The argument that excessive personal liability for directors and officers
might dissuade qualified individuals from seeking such positions was resurrected by the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s (PSLRA) House Conference Committee
members in justifying the bill’s heightening of protections for outside directors. See
H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 38 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 737.
41. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
42. See NAGY et al., supra note 3, at 14–15.
43. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976).
44. See Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13
n.9 (1971) (recognizing the implied right of action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b5); 15 U.S.C. §77(v).
45. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–42 (1988).
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suits.46 In response to a perceived excess of class action suits in the wake
of Basic Inc. v. Levinson, Congress soon undertook to reform the
securities laws and the class action vehicle.47 However, when the federal
securities laws were amended, the 1933 and 1934 Acts were changed in
substantially similar ways, which, due in part to their
interconnectedness, led to statutory conflict where the statutes did not
precisely mirror each other.48
1. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA)
Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(PSLRA) in 1995, amending both the 1933 and 1934 Acts.49 The
legislation was intended to limit the ability of lawyers to file abusive and
unmeritorious “strike” suits alleging violations of the federal securities
laws in pursuit of a settlement.50 Though Congress recognized the
importance of the private securities litigation system to maintaining the
integrity of American capital markets, reform was necessary to protect
the system from “those who seek to line their own pockets by bringing
abusive and meritless suits.”51 Chief among the identified harms of such
frivolous lawsuits was that the time and expense required to litigate
them unnecessarily increased the cost of raising capital for companies. 52
Additionally, Congress expressed concern that the threat of litigation
could exert a chilling effect on corporate disclosure of bad news, even
where there was no evidence of actionable fraud.53 Settlements to

46. See Note, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Rise of Securities-Fraud Class
Actions, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1067, 1067 (2019) [hereinafter The Rise of SecuritiesFraud Class Actions].
47. See id. at 1070.
48. See Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cnty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1068 (2018).
49. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, PUB. L. NO. 104–67, 109
Stat. 737 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77–78).
50. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679,
683.
51. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31.
52. See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4.
53. See id. In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the Supreme Court endorsed the fraud-on-themarket theory presuming investor reliance on corporate misstatements, which
eliminated the need to show individual reliance and became the dominant theory for
Rule 10b-5 class actions. 485 U.S. 224, 241–42 (1988); see also The Rise of SecuritiesFraud Class Actions, supra note 46, at 1070. The Court declined to overrule Basic in
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), noting that the academic
critiques of the efficient capital markets hypothesis did not “refute[] the modest premise
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unmeritorious suits required insurers to make settlement payments, pay
lawyers’ fees, and expend company time and resources defending
against the meritless claims—costs that would ultimately be passed on
to investors, the nominal beneficiaries of securities lawsuits.54
Taken to the extreme, this “circularity hypothesis” posits that
sufficiently diversified investors, who are as likely to be on the winning
side as the losing side of a securities fraud claim, derive no benefit from
transfers of money under civil securities actions, especially in light of
the high transaction costs surrounding securities class actions.55
However, even proponents of the theory admit that the principle applies
only to highly diversified traders with constant and relatively high
turnover, leaving the less diversified investors comprising “roughly half
of the . . . market”56 without a means to obtain recovery.57 Additionally,
such criticisms completely ignore the animating purpose of the 1933
Act, which was to protect the general investing public, not sophisticated,
large-volume investors.58
Indeed, the class action vehicle itself is often scrutinized as to
whether it accomplishes the goals of the anti-securities-fraud laws:
narrowly, compensating victims and deterring fraud, and more broadly,
ensuring that the valuable information investors derive from securities
markets is undistorted by managerial fraud.59 However, the close privity
between the buyer of the security and the issuer in a Section 11 action
nullifies many of the critiques directed at class actions under the wealth
transfer theory.60 Specifically, material misstatements or omissions in a
firm’s registration statements cannot be attributed to superseding causes

underlying the presumption of reliance,” which is that public information affects stock
prices. 573 U.S. 258, 272 (2014).
54. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32.
55. See Thomas A. Dubbs, A Scotch Verdict on “Circularity” and Other Issues,
2009 WIS. L. REV. 455, 457 (2009).
56. Id. at 457–58; see ANJAN V. THAKOR, THE ECONOMIC REALITY OF SECURITIES
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 7 (2005), http://apps.olin.wustl.edu/faculty/Thakor/Website
%20Papers/EconomicNavigantReality_10-26-05.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JJM-UANL].
57. See Dubbs, supra note 55, at 458.
58. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
59. See The Rise of Securities-Fraud Class Actions, supra note 46, at 1067.
60. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on
Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1556–57 (2006).
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in the same way that a drop in stock price leading to a § 10(b) suit can,
greatly decreasing the likelihood of frivolous litigation or strike suits.61
The final PSLRA bill, which passed over a presidential veto,
extended “far beyond frivolous litigation . . . [containing] measures
reflecting concerns raised by a number of different constituencies.” 62
The final result was a “diverse assortment of measures . . . that
significantly alter the treatment of meritorious claims, as well as
frivolous ones.”63 Even though the “rhetoric of the litigation reform
debate” often describes a broad range of cases as frivolous, the category
includes cases that are merely marginal or speculative as well as those
that are truly without merit.64
The measures of the PSLRA restricted actions brought under both
the 1933 and 1934 Acts65 with the goal of making it easier for courts to
dispose of securities cases filed without a substantial factual or legal
basis.66 They included provisions governing the appointment of “most
adequate” lead plaintiffs, limitations on lead plaintiffs’ recoveries and
attorney’s fees, heightened requirements for giving notice of settlements
to class members, and an automatic discovery stay until motions to
dismiss were resolved.67 Corporate defendants also benefited from
heightened protections under the PSLRA, including a system of
proportionate rather than joint and several liability for defendants, a
statutory safe harbor for forward-looking statements, and mandatory
sanctions for violations of Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.68 Following the PSLRA, it became substantially more
difficult for investors to maintain securities class actions in federal
court, though such actions continued to surge.69

61. See, e.g., Jennifer J. Johnson & Edward Brunet, Critiquing Arbitration of
Shareholder Claims, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 181, 181 (2008).
62. John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 BUS. LAW. 335, 336 (1996).
63. Id. at 336.
64. Id. at 353.
65. See Wendy Gerwick Couture, Cyan, Reverse-Erie, and the PSLRA Discovery
Stay in State Court, 47 SEC. REG. L.J. 21, 22 (2019).
66. See Avery, supra note 62, at 353–54.
67. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 32-37.
68. See Avery, supra note 62, at 336–37.
69. See The Rise of Securities-Fraud Class Actions, supra note 46, at 1071.
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2. The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA)
The immediate effect of the PSLRA was creating an avenue
through the state courts for securities class actions to avoid the PSLRA’s
new procedural and substantive protections.70 Though some commenters
argue that there is little empirical evidence to support that such a venue
shift actually took place on a significant scale, Congress acted swiftly in
enacting the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
(SLUSA), which restricted to federal court most securities fraud class
actions.71 The magnitude of the shift in venue is discussed in detail in
Part II of this note.72 Notably, due to the absence of an express provision
in the federal securities laws specifying the choice of law, securities
fraud class action lawsuits required state courts to apply a “reverse-Erie
doctrine” to determine whether to apply state or federal procedural
law.73
The two main prongs of SLUSA are first, to preclude certain class
actions based on state statutory or common law from adjudication in
state or federal courts; and second, to make all covered class actions of
50 or more plaintiffs pertaining to covered securities removable from
state to federal court.74 In accordance with this goal of keeping such
actions out of state courts, SLUSA amended Section 22 of the 1933 Act,
allowing removal to federal court for claims brought under the Act
despite its removal bar.75 Public offerings of securities under the 1933
Act result in nationally listed and traded securities that land squarely

70. See Michael S. Flynn, Paul S. Mishkin, and Edmund Polubinski III, The
Supreme Court’s Cyan Decision and What Happens Next, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (May 3, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/05/03/the-supremecourts-cyan-decision-and-what-happens-next [https://perma.cc/LM7F-8WUD].
71. See Jennifer J. Johnson, Securities Class Actions in State Court, 80 UNIV. CIN.
L. REV. 349, 353–54 (2011). It is worth noting that litigating in state court does not
necessarily favor the plaintiff in a shareholder dispute. For instance, Richard Jennings
wrote in the mid-1970s that “no shareholder in his right mind will litigate a shareholder
grievance [related to corporate mismanagement or shareholder abuse] in a Delaware
state court if some other forum is available.” Roe, supra note 6, at 615 (quoting Richard
W. Jennings, Federalization of Corporation Law: Part Way or All the Way, 31 BUS.
LAW. 991, 997 (1976)).
72. See infra Section II.B.
73. See Couture, supra note 65, at 24-25; see also Kevin M. Clermont, ReverseErie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 4 (2006).
74. See Johnson, supra note 71, at 354-55.
75. See id. at 358.

2021]

CYAN AND ITS IMPACT

265

under SLUSA’s definition of covered securities, leading to the conflict
at the heart of Cyan.76
SLUSA also contained several exceptions, such as a “Delaware
Carve-Out” preserving state court jurisdiction for covered class actions
based upon the state law of the issuer’s incorporation, as well as
exemptions for actions brought by state regulators or state pension
plans.77 The Supreme Court subsequently construed SLUSA’s
provisions broadly in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v.
Dabit, holding that such an interpretation properly followed the intent of
Congress in enacting SLUSA to “prevent certain State private securities
class action lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to frustrate the
objectives of [SLUSA].”78 Notably, SLUSA’s amendments to the 1933
and 1934 Acts were “substantially identical.”79
3. Continued Federalization of Class Actions under the Class Action
Fairness Act (CAFA)
In 2005, Congress passed a third set of class action reforms, the
Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), which continued the trend of
directing class action litigation to the federal courts. CAFA conferred
federal jurisdiction over class actions with 100 or more claimants, an
amount in controversy exceeding $5 million, and a new “minimal
diversity” requirement, satisfied if any member of the plaintiff class was
from a different state than the defendant.80 However, CAFA contained
numerous exceptions and carve-outs, including for covered securities as
defined by SLUSA and class actions concerning internal corporate
governance (dubbed the “Delaware Carve-Out”).81 The reforms
introduced in CAFA thus had little impact on securities litigation in
general.82 Edward Sherman attributes this result to the fact that it took so
long to pass the law that “court decisions, judicial oversight, and 2003
amendments to the federal rules” preempted many of the originally

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

2005).

See id. at 358–59.
Id. at 354; see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(3)(A).
547 U.S. 71, 82 (2006); accord S. REP. No. 105–182, at 2 (1998).
Dabit, 547 U.S. at 82 n.6.
Johnson, supra note 71, at 356–57.
See id. at 354, 357.
See id. at 365 fig.1 (showing a steady rise in state securities class actions since
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intended class-member-oriented reforms, leaving alleged forumshopping as CAFA’s ultimate target.83
Despite the decade-long effort by Congress to thwart unprincipled
or opportunistic class-action lawsuits, the reforms had the effect of
driving many smaller plaintiffs’ firms out of the securities arena, while
larger firms emerged strengthened.84 The resulting securities class-action
landscape thus resembled the securities industry in the wake of the 1933
Act, when dominant underwriters were able to regain market share from
cost competitors due to heightened regulatory entry barriers.85
C. THE FEDERAL COURTS
In the years leading up to Cyan, the federal courts were split over
whether 1933 Act claims could properly be brought in state courts in
light of SLUSA reforms.86 The split was “dramatic”—a majority of
district courts in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth circuits held that SLUSA divested state courts
of their jurisdiction to hear 1933 Act cases, including class actions,
while a majority of district courts in the First, Seventh, Ninth, and
Eleventh circuits held that state court jurisdiction was unchanged by
SLUSA and remanded the challenged cases.87 Even as rulings on
motions to remove or remand 1933 Act claims during this period
acknowledged the lack of clarity in SLUSA’s removal provision, absent
further guidance from Congress, courts continued to reach conflicting
results when attempting to resolve the discrepancy.88
83. Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions After the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,
80 TUL. L. REV. 1593, 1594–95 (2006).
84. See Johnson, supra note 71, at 350; see also Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s
Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 1593, 1594 (2008) (“When
past reforms targeted class action lawyers, however, some of those lawyers made out
quite well, proving that as lawyers adapt, the fittest may not only survive but thrive.”).
85. See supra Section I.A.; see also Mahoney, supra note 16, at 31.
86. See, e.g., Knox v. Agria Corp., 613 F. Supp. 2d 419, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2009),
abrogated by Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cnty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061 (2018); cf.
Fortunato v. Akebia Therapeutics, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 3d 326, 332 (D. Mass. 2016);
Pipefitters Locals 522 & 633 Pension Tr. Fund v. Salem Commc’ns Corp., No. CV 052730 RGK MCX, 2005 WL 6963459, *3 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 2005).
87. See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners at 4-5,
Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cnty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061 (2018) (No. 15-1439),
2016 WL 3538388, at *11–12 [hereinafter Brief of Law Professors].
88. See supra note 86.
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The main guidance offered by the Supreme Court in this period was
Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, which addressed whether orders to
remand certain cases to state court under SLUSA could be appealed. 89
However, some district courts chose to disregard this portion of the
opinion as it was dicta, and instead performed their own analyses or
distinguished Kircher in other ways, reaching the opposite result.90
Thus, class actions alleging pure 1933 Act claims could be filed in state
or federal court in some jurisdictions, while they could be filed only in
federal court in other jurisdictions, “a phenomenon that Congress could
not have . . . intended when it enacted SLUSA.”91 Of particular note was
the split between courts in California and New York, specifically
between the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California—
holding that 1933 Act class actions were not removable to federal
court—and the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York—holding that SLUSA granted exclusive jurisdiction over such
class actions to the federal courts.92 The potential for forum shopping by
aspiring Section 11 claimants in these jurisdictions was particularly
concerning for high-tech firms based in Silicon Valley, many of which
listed their initial public offerings (IPOs) on New York exchanges;
indeed, filings of such cases in California state court increased rapidly
between 2011 and 2018.93
Courts in the pre-Cyan era realized the inherent ambiguity in
Congress’s amendments to the 1933 Act.94 However, despite the debate
over the proper application of SLUSA and CAFA to 1933 Act claims,
relatively few plaintiffs actually attempted to litigate such claims in state
court.95
Two pre-Cyan decisions demonstrate the statutory interpretation
that state and federal courts had to engage in to resolve 1933 Act forum

89. 547 U.S. 633, 648 (2006). Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment of an
otherwise united Court, but did not join Part II of the opinion, which squarely addressed
the scope of SLUSA’s removal bar as it related to class actions brought pursuant to
state law claims. See id. at 640-44, 648.
90. See Niitsoo v. Alpha Nat. Res., Inc., 902 F. Supp. 2d 797, 803–04 (S.D. W. Va.
2012) (holding that the 1933 Act only permitted removal of securities class actions
alleging state law fraud claims under the § 77v(a) removal bar and remanded the case).
91. Brief of Law Professors, supra note 80, at 8.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 8–9; Michael Klausner et al., State Section 11 Litigation in the PostCyan Environment (Despite Sciabacucchi), 75 BUS. LAW. 1769, 1775 fig.1 (2020).
94. See Niitsoo, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 804.
95. See infra Section II.B.
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disputes. In Knox v. Agria Corp., the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York directly addressed the division among
district courts on the issue of whether the “anti-removal provision”
applied to class actions raising solely 1933 Act claims.96 Recognizing
both the “jurisdictional anomaly” created by SLUSA’s additions to
Section 16, and the inherently “labyrinthine” nature of SLUSA’s
amendments, the court held that SLUSA’s exemptions did not bar
removal from state court and consolidation with the ongoing federal
court case.97 This reading purportedly “harmonize[d] with the rest of
SLUSA.”98
By contrast, in Luther v. Countrywide Financial Corp., the
California Court of Appeal held that 1933 Act claims were not “covered
class actions” under the text of SLUSA.99 Just because SLUSA had
intended to bar certain class actions, it did not necessarily follow that the
law was meant to prevent all class actions; the court accordingly
preserved the 1933 Act’s concurrent jurisdiction and bar on removal for
actions brought in state court.100 The Luther court dismissed the
statutory interpretation of Knox as flawed and disagreed with its
legislative intent argument, successfully anticipating the Supreme
Court’s analysis of the issue.101
II. CYAN AND AFTERMATH
In response to the heightened pleading and class certification
standards resulting from class action reform in the PSLRA and SLUSA,
1933 Act class actions were increasingly brought in state courts.102 In
recent years, state court securities class action lawsuits are once again on
the rise.103 Part I described the development of the federal securities
laws as they pertain to class actions; Part II now evaluates the Cyan
decision and its impact on the securities class-action landscape at the
state level.

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

613 F. Supp. 2d 419, 422 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
Id. at 423–25.
Id. at 425.
125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 716, 717–18 (Ct. App. 2011).
See id. at 721–22.
See id.
See Flynn et al., supra note 70.
138 S. Ct. 1061, 1066 (2018).
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A. THE CYAN DECISION
The Supreme Court ruled unanimously in Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver
County Employees Retirement Fund that class actions brought under the
1933 Act as amended by SLUSA were: (1) permitted to be brought in
state court; and (2) were not removable to federal court.104 The opinion,
authored by Justice Elena Kagan, upheld the bar on removal for actions
alleging claims purely under the 1933 Act.105 In its analysis, the Court
distinguished the PSLRA’s substantive changes to the 1933 and 1934
Acts, which applied to 1933 Act claims brought in state court, from
procedural changes that only applied to suits brought in federal court.106
The relevant SLUSA amendments consisted of “two operative
provisions, two associated definitions, and two ‘conforming
amendments’” to the jurisdictional section of the 1933 Act.107 In
addition to prohibiting certain “covered class action[s]” based on state
law from being brought in any state or federal court, SLUSA also
provided that covered class actions concerning securities fraud were
removable to federal court,108 where the case was subject to dismissal as
a precluded action.109 The intent of this removal provision was to ensure
that even in the case where state courts refused to faithfully obey
SLUSA’s preclusion provisions, a federal court could properly make the
preclusion determination.110
The two conforming amendments, intended to affect SLUSA’s
scheme of restricting certain class actions, applied SLUSA to both: (1)
the 1933 Act’s bar on removal for claims brought in state court; and (2)
concurrent jurisdiction for state and federal district courts over cases
brought under the 1933 Act with the exception of covered class actions
under SLUSA.111 This second amendment lay at the “heart of the
parties’ dispute,” namely, whether lawsuits bringing claims solely under
the 1933 Act could properly be brought in state court.112

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1066–67.
Id. at 1067.
See id.; see also Kircher v. Putnam Funds Tr., 547 U.S. 633, 643 (2006).
See Kircher, 547 U.S. at 644.
Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1068.
See id. at 1068.
See id. Cyan, Inc. was a telecommunications company (subsequently acquired
by Ciena Corp.) that sold shares to investors in an initial public offering. Press Release,
Ciena Corp., Ciena Completes Acquisition of Cyan (Aug. 3, 2015),

270

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXVI

The Court resolved the question on strictly textual grounds, finding
that “[SLUSA] says what it says—or perhaps better put here, does not
say what it does not say.”113 In the absence of a clear congressional
intent to amend the 1933 Act to disallow concurrent jurisdiction for state
courts, pure 1933 Act claims, including class actions, would remain
within the state courts’ purview.114 In doing so, the Court applied the
presumption in favor of concurrent jurisdiction for state and federal
courts when interpreting federal law.115 The “except clause” of § 77p(b)
barred certain securities class actions based on state law from state
court, but did nothing to deprive state courts of jurisdiction over class
actions based on federal law, meaning that state courts retained the
power to hear 1933 Act suits, including class actions.116 The Court
rejected the argument that the “except clause would serve no purpose at
all” unless it was indeed intended to divest state courts of 1933 Act class
actions.117 Instead, the “except clause” was construed to bar “mixed”
securities class actions containing claims under both the 1933 Act and
state law.118 Thus, state courts retained concurrent jurisdiction only over
pure 1933 Act violations.
Additional policy considerations in support of the Court’s decision
were raised in amicus briefs, though left unaddressed by the Court,
likely due to a desire to limit the scope of the decision to a narrow and

https://www.ciena.com/about/newsroom/press-releases/Ciena-Cyan-Acquisition-NowClosed_prx.html [https://perma.cc/V2VJ-NRT4]. The IPO was a failure, with shares
opening down 9%. Cyan Inc shares open below IPO price, Reuters, (May 9, 2013),
https://www.reuters.com/article/cyan-ipo/cyan-inc-shares-open-below-ipo-priceidUKL3N0DQ3QW20130509 [https://perma.cc/SL45-NJBL].
113. Id. at 1069.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 1069 n.2 (citing Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 378
(2012)). The amicus brief by scholars of federal jurisdiction and securities law clearly
identified points that the Court found persuasive, particularly the presumption in favor
of concurrent state court jurisdiction when interpreting federal law (set forth in Tafflin
v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990)), but also the lack of an “explicit statutory
directive” withdrawing state court jurisdiction in SLUSA. See generally Brief of Amici
Curiae Federal Jurisdiction & Securities Law Scholars in Support of Respondents at 2–
3, 9–10, Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cnty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061 (2018) (No. 151439), 2017 WL 4805224.
116.
See Cyan, 138 S. Ct. at 1069.
117. Id. at 1073.
118. See id. at 1073–74.

2021]

CYAN AND ITS IMPACT

271

summary statutory interpretation matter.119 For one, the fact that state
courts had possessed concurrent jurisdiction over 1933 Act claims for
over six decades at the time SLUSA was passed provided hefty
precedent in favor of retaining that jurisdiction, especially because
Congress had not provided a clear indication of its intent to divest it
when enacting SLUSA.120 Additionally, SLUSA’s “core purpose” was
to limit class actions brought pursuant to state law securities claims by
making “[f]ederal court the exclusive venue for securities fraud class
action litigation.”121 One of the most irksome litigation tactics employed
by plaintiffs’ lawyers following the PSLRA was circumventing the
heightened pleading requirements for 1934 Act § 10(b) fraud claims by
bringing cases in state court.122 However, the PSLRA did not heighten
pleading standards on 1933 Act claims, undercutting a key argument for
applying SLUSA’s restrictions to such suits, as the pleading
requirements for such claims remained the same in state and federal
court.123
Due to its narrow focus on the proper construction of SLUSA as it
pertained to the 1933 Act, Cyan left a number of questions unanswered.
For one, the Court distinguished the PSLRA’s substantive changes,
applying to all cases brought under the 1933 and 1934 Acts, from its
procedural changes, applying only to suits brought in federal court. 124
However, the Court did not explicitly address the question of whether
the discovery stay mandated by the PSLRA applied in 1933 Act cases
brought in state court, though the question was raised in several briefs.125
119. It was, after all, Justice Kagan who famously proclaimed that “we’re all
textualists now.” Harvard L. Sch., The Antonin Scalia Lecture Series: A Dialogue with
Justice Elena Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, YOUTUBE (Nov. 25, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg [https://perma.cc/Z75Y-NVZN].
120. See Brief of Institutional Investors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at
4, Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cnty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061 (2018) (No. 15-1439),
2017 WL 4770980 [hereinafter Brief of Institutional Investors].
121. Id. at 11, 14 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 105-640, at 10 (1998)).
122. See id. at 12.
123. See id. at 12–13.
124. See Couture, supra note 65, at 24.
125. See id. at 24 (citing Brief for Petitioners at 27, Cyan, 136 S. Ct. 1061 (No. 151439), 2017 WL 3773872); see also Brief of Institutional Investors, supra note 113, at
16; Brief of the Securities Industry & Financial Markets Association et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 10, Cyan, 136 S. Ct. 1061 (No. 15-1439), 2017 WL
3948181; Brief of Law Professors, supra note 80, at 11–12. Couture contends that the
reverse-Erie doctrine applies to the PSLRA discovery stay, and, in the absence of an
express preemption of state discovery rules in the statute, that the discovery stay should
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Michael Klausner identifies two additional procedural issues of primary
importance that arise in Section 11 cases: pleading standards for
complaints to survive motions to dismiss, and whether and how parallel
state and federal cases are coordinated or consolidated.126 How state
courts choose to handle these issues will have a far more significant
impact on where investors choose to bring 1933 Act suits in the future
than any perceived advantages of forum-shopping. Though these
questions remain unsettled, some argue that the PSLRA discovery stay
does not apply, leaving state courts to apply local discovery rules, and
perhaps judicial discretion.127
B. FILING AND SUCCESS RATES FOR STATE SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS
BEFORE AND AFTER CYAN
In the aftermath of the Cyan decision, critics predicted a new wave
of forum-shopping by class-action litigators and “inconsistent,
unpredictable standards across multiple jurisdictions.”128 Worth noting is
that this was, of course, the same situation that preceded Cyan.129 The
intervention of the Cyan decision provides a useful lens to evaluate the
claim of whether securities class actions should be restricted to the
federal courts.
The two primary sources of data for this section are articles
describing empirical studies spanning the period from 1995–2010130 and
2011–2019,131 respectively. Johnson’s 2011 study of securities class
action suits brought in state court provides highly detailed data on classaction filings during and after the class-action reform era.132 The data
demonstrate that the reform acts were initially quite successful, reducing
state securities class-action filings from 50–100 per year in the
immediate aftermath of the PSLRA and SLUSA to less than 50 per year

not apply to 1933 Act claims brought in state court. See Couture, supra note 65, at 2426.
126. See Klausner et al., supra note 93, at 1771.
127. See Couture, supra note 65, at 31.
128. Flynn et al., supra note 70.
129. See supra Section I.D.
130. See generally Johnson, supra note 71.
131. See Klausner et al., supra note 93, at 1771.
132. See generally Johnson, supra note 71.
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from 2001–2003.133 However, from 2004 onwards, state securities class
actions rose steadily, exceeding 250 filings annually by 2010 and
actually exceeding the amount of federal security class-action filings.134
Whether an intended consequence or an unintended byproduct of
congressional reform, the worst fears of the drafters of the PSLRA and
SLUSA had come to pass.
However, the data presented in figures one and two of the Johnson
article include all securities-related class actions brought in state court.
The specific data on Section 11 and 12 class-action filings demonstrates
that plaintiffs rarely pursue IPO claims in state court, bringing between
zero and three such cases per year from 1999–2010.135 The main drivers
of state-level securities class actions during this period were Merger &
Acquisition (M&A) objection class action suits, which took advantage
of SLUSA’s Delaware carve-out to bring state court actions that had the
added advantage of exerting enormous pressure on defendants to settle
in order to be able to complete their transaction swiftly.136
Klausner’s study of state-level Section 11 litigation in the postCyan environment picks up in 2011, leaving no gap in the data set. 137
The data shows an increase in state court filings of IPO suits, even in the
years preceding Cyan compared to the previous decade, but the spike in
such filings following Cyan is remarkable.138 IPO claims brought
exclusively in state court comprise 22 percent of 1933 Act cases in the
post-Cyan years, as opposed to 18 percent in the four years preceding
the decision.139 Based on this empirical filing data, Klausner concludes
that “unless Congress intervenes, the days of Section 11 cases being
filed largely in federal court are over.”140 The New York courts in
particular are now a popular forum for Section 11 cases, with 40 percent
of post-Cyan state cases filed in a forum that had heard no Section 11

133. Id. at 365–66 figs.1 & 2. Johnson notes that a contributing cause of the drop in
state level filings could also have been the bursting of the dot-com bubble and a
concomitant spike in federal class-action filings in 2001, as shown in Figure 2. See id.
at 366.
134. See id. at 366 & n.96.
135. See id. at 376 figs.9 & 10.
136. See id. at 378, 384–85.
137. See Klausner et al., supra note 93, at 1775 fig.1.
138. See id.
139. Id. at 1775 fig.2.
140. Michael Klausner et al., State Section 11 Litigation in the Post-Cyan
Environment, BUS. LAW. (2020) (unpublished manuscript at 7) (on file with author).
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cases prior to the decision.141 Additionally, the study found that state
courts are less likely than federal courts to grant motions to dismiss 142
and that Section 11 cases are marginally more likely to settle when
brought in state court.143 However, settlement data shows no significant
relationship between settlement size and venue choice, particularly
when large outlier settlements from federal court cases are excluded.144
C. FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION 11 SUITS
Because Cyan was resolved purely on questions of statutory
interpretation, the tasks of filling in policy justifications and making
sense of unanswered procedural questions was left to the courts
below.145 In re Everquote, Inc. Securities Litigation discussed the split
among state courts on whether the PSLRA’s discovery stay applies in
state court, both at the concurrent New York level and in other states.146
Noting the “undesirable . . . and absurd incentive” that would be created
by inconsistent discovery regimes in state and federal courts, and
following an extensive reverse-Erie interpretation of the 1933 Act as
amended, the court concluded that the PSLRA’s stay did apply to “any
private action arising under [the] subchapter,” including a Section 11
case.147
A novel question of corporate governance briefly arose when Cyan
was applied in the Delaware courts, leading to a surprising result that
was soon overturned. The case of Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi centered on
a Section 11 class action resulting from alleged misstatements in the
registration statements of two Delaware corporations. 148 The issue, one
of first impression in Delaware, was whether the federal forum
provisions (FFPs) contained in the corporate charters were enforceable

141.
142.

Klausner et. al, supra note 93, at 1779.
See id. at 1777 tbl.1. Between 2011 and 2019, state courts granted motions to
dismiss in 28% of all cases, compared to 39% in federal courts. Id.
143. See id. at 1778 tbl.2. Between 2011 and 2019, 67% of Section 11 cases brought
in state court settled, compared to 65% of such cases brought in federal court. Id.
144.
See id. at 1780-81.
145. See supra Section II.A.
146. See 106 N.Y.S.3d 828, 828–30 (Sup. Ct. 2019).
147. See id. at 834–35, 837 (emphasis in original).
148. No. 2017-0931-JTL, 2018 WL 6719718, at *7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 2018),
rev’d, Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102 (Del. 2020).
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under the Court‘s upholding of the 1933 Act’s removal bar in Cyan.149
Surprisingly, the Delaware Chancery Court held that shareholders could
not be bound to a particular forum when “the claim [did] not involve
rights or relationships that were established by or under Delaware’s
corporate law.”150
The Delaware Supreme Court soon intervened and reversed.
Describing FFPs as a “relatively recent phenomenon designed to address
the post-Cyan difficulties presented by multi-forum litigation of
Securities Act claims,” the court found that such provisions fell within
the plain meaning of § 102(b)(1) of the Delaware General Corporation
Law (DGCL).151 Additionally, the court stated that FFPs advanced the
DGCL’s policy goals of “predictability, uniformity, and prompt judicial
resolution to corporate disputes,” a familiar argument to advocates of
moving all class-action disputes to the federal courts.152 This result
clearly demonstrates the limit of Cyan’s influence on matters outside the
narrow statutory grounds on which the case was decided.
III. ANALYSIS
Cyan and subsequent cases highlight the importance of enacting
federal legislation with consistent standards in federal and state court,
particularly where the enacted law affects claims that can be brought in
state courts. The PSLRA applied substantive reforms to the 1933 and
1934 Acts that apply in state and federal courts. The fact that certain
procedural reforms only applied to actions brought in federal court due
to the idiosyncrasies of the 1933 Act created a new way for plaintiffs to
make end-runs around SLUSA in the same way that the gaps in the
PSLRA incentivized lawyers to bring actions in state courts.
Empirical data on securities class action filings demonstrates that in
the wake of Cyan, investors are eager to bring Section 11 suits in state
court.153 However, it is too early to say whether this is a permanent
increase in litigation, or merely a temporary bump resulting from
litigators testing the waters in state courts. The year after the PSLRA
passed also saw a massive spike in state-level securities class-action
filings that receded almost immediately as plaintiffs’ lawyers realized

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at *15.
Id. at *3.
Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102, 137 (Del. 2020).
Id.
See supra Section II.B.
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the forums were not as hospitable as Congress had led them to
believe.154 Deciding whether state or federal procedural law applies to
such actions will likely be far more determinative in whether this trend
becomes permanent, particularly in the unlikely scenario that state
courts apply more permissive discovery rules to securities class actions
and the Supreme Court does not return to the issue. As demonstrated by
the swift reversal of Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, it is hard to imagine that
such a significant asymmetry in discovery rules can persist.
In starker terms, the decision is the latest iteration in the longrunning battle between investors and corporations, fought over the past
25 years in Congress, federal and state courts, and increasingly now in
front of the Supreme Court. Advocates for aggressive securities fraud
litigation and the class action vehicle should not be excessively bullish
about a holding that affirmed a procedural advantage for a small subset
of securities class actions related to initial securities offerings,
particularly because the result was reached strictly through statutory
interpretation rather than on any policy grounds. Still, the ruling marks a
narrow but significant victory for shareholders and their advocates, who
may avail themselves of state law forums where appropriate;
particularly, the Delaware courts, in Section 11 cases where no federal
forum provision in the corporate charter mandates removal. Investors
and plaintiffs’ lawyers alike can take comfort that nearly 90 years after
the institution of the federal securities regulation scheme, courts
continue to honor Congress’ original intent of compensation for all
injured investors in the absence of transparent and honest disclosure in
the securities markets.

154.

See Johnson, supra note 71, at 365–66 figs.1 & 2.

